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Sick Leave Benefits: The NLRB
Reexamines The Rights of Disabled
Employees During a Strike
In E.L. Wiegand Division, Emerson Electric Co.,1 the National Labor
Relations Board (Board) held that an employer may no longer require
disabled employees on sick leave to disavow strike activity in order to
receive employee disability benefits. The Board went on to hold, however,
that once the disabled employee shows affirmative support for the strike,
he runs the risk of forfeiting his right to disability benefits. In Emerson,
the Board completely reexamined the rights of disabled employees in the
context of a labor dispute and expressly overruled its prior decision in
Southwestern Electric Power Co.2
In Emerson, management and the union, s which represented Emerson's
approximately 1,100 employees, were engaged in negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement that was to begin on November 1, 1977.
Union representatives were unable to come to terms with the company
and called an economic strike' to begin the moment the existing contract
was to expire. The strike was effective and the plant was completely
closed from November 1 to February 28, 1978, at which time an agreement was reached beween the company and the union.
On the day before the strike was to begin, twenty-three of the company's employees were physically disabled and could not report to work.
Each had previously been receiving "sick and accident" benefits pursuant
to Emerson's employee disability benefits plan.' When the strike began,
1. 246 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 103 L.R.R.M. 1073 (Dec. 19, 1979).
2. 216 N.L.R.B. 522, 88 L.R.R.M. 1342 (1975).
3. The union representing the employees was the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1020. It was found
to be a labor organization within the meaning of § 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976).
4. Strikes are divided into two categories. An unfair labor practice strike is one caused or
prolonged by the unfair labor practices of the employer. All employees who leave their jobs
to strike are entitled to reinstatement. An economic strike is one over wages, hours, working
conditions, or other conditions of employment. The employer is free to replace striking employees in an economic strike. 2 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 7.25 n.40 (Supp. 1974).
5. Emerson's disability benefits plan is a form of self-insurance. Employees who were
unable to work because of illness continued to receive 60% of their weekly income. Disabled
employees were eligible for up to 39 weeks of benefits, depending upon their seniority with
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the company terminated these benefits, despite strong union protest that
the disabled employees were not participants in the strike and were not
receiving union strike benefits.
Several of the disabled employees recovered during the strike while
others remained disabled until it was over. Most decided to remain silent
and inactiie, but many of the disabled employees joined the picket line or
publicly expressed their support for the strike.' The day after the strike
ended, the company resumed payment of "sick and accident" benefits to
those employees who remained disabled.8
A complaint was brought by the General Counsel of the Board, based
upon charges filed by the union alleging that Emerson's withholding of
benefits to those employees who remained disabled during the strike was
a coercive act in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). e General Counsel argued that the company's
termination of disability benefits was an unlawful restraint upon the
rights of all employees to engage in concerted activities.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) agreed. 10 He reasoned that, since
the twenty-three employees were physically unable to work, they could
not consciously withhold their services and, thus, should not be considered strikers. Furthermore, he viewed these benefits as a form of deferred
compensation that disabled employees were entitled to receive by virtue
of their previous employment relationship, irrespective of the strike action. 1 He concluded that the disabled employees should not be required
the company. 103 L.R.R.M. at 1074 (Member Jenkins, dissenting).
6. The union did not automatically provide the disabled employees with strike benefits
because of its uniform policy that no strike benefits would be paid unless the individual
participated in the strike. However, once the union realized that the company was not going
to provide benefits to disabled employees, it waived this requirement on December 12 and
began paying strike benefits to all disabled employees, regardless of their participation in
the strike. Id. at 1075 n.16.
7. The Board pointed out that at least seven of the named disabled employees were
present on the picket line or among the strikers during the course of the strike. Two more
were seen on the picket line after recovery. Id. at 1074 n.5.
8. E.L. Wiegand Div., Emerson Elec. Co., No. 6-CA-10781 (Ad. Law Judge Thomas A.
Rucci, Mar. 16, 1979).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1976). Section 8 provides, in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer0
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section [7];
(2) . . .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition, of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. . ..
10. No. 6-CA-10781 (Ad. Law Judge Thomas A. Rucci, Mar. 16, 1979).
11. Id. The Administrative Law Judge refused to conclude that Southwestern precluded
his decision. He read Southwestern along with Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 236 N.L.R.B.
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to disavow the strike in order to collect benefits.
Prior to its decision in Emerson, the Board viewed an employer's termination of employee disability benefits during a strike in a different
fashion. In Southwestern Electric Power Co., 2 the employer treated six
of its employees on sick leave at the beginning of the strike as strikers
and discontinued payment of disability benefits. The majority of the
Board" framed the issue as "whether the [employer's] belief that the
[employees] ratified and supported the strike was reasonable."'4 If so,

"(i]n the absence of any indication whatsoever that the six employees did
not support the strike, it was entirely reasonable for [the employer] to
assume that they did."'" This decision placed the burden upon the employee to show that his employer's actions were unreasonable.
The majority in Southwestern relied heavily upon two previous Board
decisions in framing this issue and deciding the case. In Marathon Electric Manufacturing Co.,'6 the Board concluded that an employer was justified in considering disabled employees on strike since none of those employees made any attempt to disassociate themselves from illegal strike
action taken by their bargaining representatives. This decision placed a
burden or duty on the disabled employee to inform his employer of his
desire to work or risk the implication that his sympathies lay with the
strikers. In a subsequent decision, Bechtel Corp.,'7 the employer classified
employees on leave of absence at the time the illegal strike began as strikers and terminated disability benefits. The Board relied upon its decision
in Marathon to reach this result, stating: "The [employee] could have
informed the [employer] that he had been on leave and disassociated
himself from the strike . . . [but] by keeping silent, the [employee] . . .

in effect ratified the strike conduct."' 8
986, 98 L.R.R.M. 1332 (1978), in which the Board held that an employer violated § 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the NLRA by promulgating a policy of refusing to pay employees accumulated
leave pay until they returned to work. In relying on these two Board decisions, the Administrative Law Judge in Emerson found that there was no general Board rule that the "mere
expression of opinion concerning the merits of strike action by persons who are in no conceivable sense capable of engaging in strike action suffices to make strikers of people who
simply are not."
12. 216 N.L.R.B. at 522, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1342.
13. Members Kennedy and Penello; Acting Chairman Fanning dissented in part.
14. 216 N.L.R.B. at 522, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1342 (emphasis added).
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. 106 N.L.R.B. 1171, 32 L.R.R.M. 1645 (1953), enforced, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981 (1956). In Marathon, the union struck the employer in violation
of a no-strike clause, and the employer countered with a lockout. A number of employees
who were not at work on the day of the walkout because of illness were terminated by the
employer.
17. 200 N.L.R.B. 503, 82 L.R.R.M. 1161 (1972).
18. Id. at 512.
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In his dissent in Southwestern," Chairman Fanning sharply criticized
the majority's view of the issue. He stated that an employee's section 720
right to join in or refrain from concerted activities includes the right to
refrain from declaring a position on the strike while medically excused.2"
In Chairman Fanning's opinion, this section 7 right was "dismissed from
consideration [by the majority] . . . in favor of a nebulous 'belief by the
Employer that medically excused Employees who do not specifically disavow a protected strike of their unit necessarily support it."2 The major-

ity's "reasonable belief" standard remained the Board's official stance on
this issue, but Chairman Fanning's dissent opened up a new question
concerning the section 7 rights of disabled employees that would not be
conclusively answered until Emerson.
In Emerson, the Board expressly overruled Southwestern and adopted
Chairman Fanning's position. 2 3 The majority held that, under section 7 of
the NLRA, a disabled employee is entitled to refrain from expressing an
opinion on the merits of an ongoing strike, as long as his disability continues. In rejecting Southwestern, the majority concluded that an employer
may not rely on speculative grounds to justify termination of existing accrued disability benefits. They reasoned that to allow an employer to ter-

minate these benefits, solely because of strike conduct by others, would
unjustly penalize those employees who had not yet acted in support of
the strike." The majority adopted the result reached by the AL-that

the company committed section 8(a)(1) and (3) violations of the NLRA.
19.
20.

216 N.L.R.B. at 522, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1342 (Chairman Fanning, dissenting).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerned activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
21. Chairman Fanning also criticized the majority's reliance on Marathon and Bechtel.
He argued that those cases dealt with violations of no-strike provisions and were distinguishable. "Cases where the Board has sanctioned the discharge of presumed strikers in the
context of strikes in violation of no-strike provisions are inapplicable." 216 N.L.R.B. at 523,
88 L.R.R.M. at 1343. Marathon and Bechtel are discussed at notes 16-18 supra, and accompanying text.
22. Id. at 523 n.5, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1342 n.5.
23. Chairman Fanning and Member Truesdale; Member Jenkins dissented in part;
Member Penello dissented.
24. The majority analogized this situation to the situation in Coronet Casuals, Inc., 207
N.L.R.B. 304, 84 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1973), and stated that, "before an employer may rely on an
honest belief that a striking employee engaged in [picket line] misconduct, it must obtain
proof that the specific employee engaged therein, and may not rely on conduct of other
strike participants." 103 L.R.R.M. at 1073-74 n.3.
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However, they limited the impact of the ALJ's conclusions in one significant respect. The ALJ viewed Emerson's disability benefits as a form of
deferred compensation that disabled employees were entitled to regardless of subsequent strike participation. The majority was not willing' to go
that far and concluded that "while disabled employees need not affirmatively disavow the strike action, neither can they participate in the strike
without running the risk of forfeiting benefits prospectively."25 Thus, any
disabled employee who affirmatively supports the strike has enmeshed
himself in the activity to such an extent as to terminate his right to continued disability benefits.
Member Jenkins, in a partial dissent, agreed with the majority's abandonment of Southwestern." However, he adopted the view taken by the
ALJ that the employer should be required to provide continued benefits
even if the disabled employees support the strike.2 His dissent raised
three interesting criticisms of the majority's limitations on employee
rights to disability benefits after they support the strike during sick leave.
After noting that Emerson's disability benefits plan was in the form-of
compensation for past services, 28 Member Jenkins concluded that these
benefits were in the nature of accrued benefits, "fully vested upon the
commencement of the employee's actual disability." 2 9 He would hold that

nothing short of total recovery would terminate the employer's fully
vested obligation to continue payment of benefits to all employees on disability prior to and during the strike.
The second criticism dealt with the majority's failure to define properly
a "striker" in the context of the disabled employee who subsequently
shows public support for the strike. 0 Due to the circumstances beyond
his control, the disabled employee, unlike active employees, is never given
the option to work.
The fact that a disabled employee, through some manner of participation in the picketing, may have expressed a certain degree of support
therefor is insufficient to render him a striker, due to the inherent inability of the disabled employee to do that act which is the sine qua non of
striker status: the voluntary withholding of services from the employer in
support of a labor dispute.31
25. 103 L.R.R.M. at 1074. An employee's actions in support of the strike may not be
used to deprive him of any benefits for sick leave prior to the supportive action. Id.
26. Id. Member Penello submitted a separate dissenting opinion expressing his continued support for the Board's decision in Southwestern, in which he participated. Id. at 1075.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. Id. See also note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1075. See also note 7 supra, and accompanying text.
31. Id.
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Finally, Member Jenkins criticized the majority for ignoring the disabled employee's motives for joining the strike. In his opinion, since the
employer committed an unfair labor practice by withholding disability
benefits from the employees at the beginning of the strike, those disabled
employees who eventually joined the picket line should more properly be
classified as unfair labor practice strikers.38 "A more likely explanation is
that [the disabled employee's] strike participation was a protest over the
specific unlawful withdrawal of benefits then due him and was unrelated
to the economic motives of the other striking employee." 8 Member Jenkins would hold that when an employer unlawfully terminates disability
benefits, the Board should not presume. that the disabled employee's subsequent participation in the strike was unrelated to the employer's unlawful conduct. The majority summarily answered this by stating that they
would "not engage in such warrantless speculation ....
""
In comparing the three approaches that have been taken by Board
members on this issue, the majority's approach in Emerson is the closest
to the overall policy behind the NLRA and is therefore the best. Section
1(b) of the NLRAss states that the purpose and policy of the Labor-Management Relations chapter is "to promote the full flow of commerce, to
prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their
relations affecting commerce,. . . [and] to define and proscribe practices
on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare ..
"
The Board's "reasonable belief" standard in Southwestern favored
management by forcing the employee to show that the employer acted
unreasonably in terminating disability benefits. The majority's rule in
Emerson represents not only an abandonment of the "reasonable belief"
standard, but also shifts the burden of proving employee intent to the
employer who must now show that he "has acquired information which
indicates that the employee... has affirmatively acted to show public
support for the strike. '"1 7 In the words of the majority, this view "represents a fair accomodation between the rights of employees and the [economic] interests of employers." Disabled employees have the protected
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. See also note 4 supra, and accompanying text.
Id.
Id. at 1074 n.8.
29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1976).

36.

Id.

37. 103 L.R.R.M. at 1074. It will be interesting to see just how much evidence the employer must present in future Board cases to satisfy the burden of showing that the disabled
employee supported the strike. In a footnote, the majority stated that affirmative support
for the strike was shown by evidence that an employee worked in the union's office answering telephone calls during the period of his disability. Id. at 1074 n.7.

38. Id.
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right to disability benefits without disavowing the strike while the employer is not obligated to finance a strike against himself once the employee has taken supportive action. 9
Member Jenkins' approach is similar to the approach taken by the majority in Emerson, differing only with regard to the consequences of subsequent strike participation. His view is that the employer should be required to pay the disability benefits even if the employee supports the
strike. "[T]he presence of disabled employees on the picket line is insufficient to establish that they are strikers .

. .,

particularly as [the] choice

[to work] was never open to them.' 0 But, the majority's limitation upon
the employee's right to disability benefits once he publicly supports the
strike is a sounder approach. Although neither of the two approaches perfectly outline NLRA policy, the majority in Emerson comes closer to
striking a balance between the competing economic interests of the employer and employee. It is basically a middle-ground approach to the
problem of protecting the employee's section 7 right to remain silent and
inactive while at the same time protecting the economic interests of the
employer. Member Jenkins would ignore the interests of the employer.
He would require that the employer continue to pay disability benefits to
employees participating in the strike, in effect, making him "finance" a
strike against himself.
The Board's balancing approach in Emerson is consistent with Board
policy that management and labor not act as completely ungoverned
gladiators in the economic arena. "[T]he Board may... exercise its duty
to strike the proper balance between the asserted business justifications
1
and the invasion of employee rights in light of the Act and its policy."'

The Board fulfilled that duty in Emerson.
W. CARTER BATES

39. The Board did not address the situation in which an employee undergoes elective
surgery in the face of an imminent strike by his unit. From a practical standpoint, upon
seeing that a strike is inevitable, an employee could voluntarily elect to have the surgery he
has needed in the past and receive disability benefits while his unit participates in the
strike. This could raise interesting questions for the Board in the future. Does this employee
fall within the protection of the rule in Emerson or will the Board view this as a voluntary
withholding of service so as to oust the disabled employee from the protection of section 7
of the NLRA? 40. 103 L.R.R.M. at 1075. Member Jenkins further argued that the majority's position
could lead to a finding that "a healthy employee who pickets an employer during off-duty
hours has thereby relinquished all right to further benefits stemming from his employment
relation. The only additional factor present here is that the disabled employee has nothing

but off-duty hours." Id. at 1075 n.14.
41. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967).

